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Article 4

JUST COMPENSATION AND THE SELLER’S
PARADOX
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2005, the Supreme Court announced one of its more
controversial decisions, Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut.1 As
the implications of this decision rippled across the legal surface, people
on both ends of the political spectrum expressed outrage.2
Justice Kennedy inquired whether “there are any writings or
scholarship that indicates that when you have property being taken from
one private person, ultimately to go to another private person, that what
we ought to do is to adjust the measure of compensation.”3 For the past
twenty-five years, the public use debate has certainly been the sexy issue
in Takings Clause jurisprudence. However, Justice Kennedy’s question
represents a natural transition from what constitutes “public use” to what
constitutes “just compensation.”
Public use and just compensation are two necessary elements of the
Takings question. Clearly, society cannot have “fair” takings without a
legitimate public use or just compensation. However, while the public
use debate has been nurtured and coddled, the compensation question has
generally been ignored. Justice Kennedy’s question is an obvious signal
that there remains more to be said about the compensation question.
Significantly, the compensation question may hold the key for
deciphering when a public use is truly public. This comment examines
the takings issue from the ignored perspective of compensation and
argues that the amount of compensation currently paid is far from “just.”
Also, this comment will present two alternatives to the current scheme
that may be more “just” in the sense that they go farther in truly making
the unwilling seller whole.

1. 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. For an interesting diatribe of the view of both conservatives and liberals, see
CIRCLETIMESSQUARE, Hi, I like your view, so I’m taking your house, Jun. 27, 2005, http:// www.
kuro5hin.org /story/2005/6/26/184754/169.
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Kelo, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108) available at, http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-108.pdf (last visited Nov. 11
2005).
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II. THE COMPENSATION QUESTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation.”4 The Supreme Court has
continually held that the just compensation requirement rests upon the
equitable principle that owners of property are entitled to the full and
perfect equivalent to the property taken. This means that owners should
be put in substantially the same position pecuniarily as they would have
been if their property had not been taken.5 However, the Court has also
recognized that certain practical difficulties make it necessary to develop
and follow “working rules.” These rules enable the Court to determine
the level of compensation that puts landowners in the same pecuniary
position as they would have been in had their land not been taken.6 The
most prolific of these “working rules” is the “fair market value; a rule so
prevalent that its use is almost exclusive.”7
But what exactly are the “practical difficulties” to which the Courts
allude? Most scholars agree that the “practical difficulties” are the
holdout landowners who try to take advantage of the government’s
bargaining position.8 If the government had to purchase land exclusively
in the open market, the government would be forced to operate in a
bilateral monopoly with the landowner in the driver’s seat.9 The
4. U.S. CONST.amend. V.
5. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Campbell v.
United States, 266 U.S. 368, (1924); Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304
(1923) (all holding that the just compensation requirement rests upon the equitable principle that the
owner is entitled to a “full and perfect equivalent to the property taken meaning that the owner shall
be put in substantially the same position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not
been taken”). See also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327–28 (1893)
(holding that landowners have a right based upon principles of natural law to receive compensation
for property that is taken). For this article, I will be working under the assumption that this language
means that the ultimate purpose of the Takings Clause is to make the landowner “whole” as defined
throughout this article.
6. See 564.54 Acres of Land, supra note 5, at 511; United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332
(1949); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943); Miller,317 U.S. at 375.
7. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984); Kirby Forest Indus. v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1984); Cors,337 U.S. at 333–34; 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at
511–13; Fuller, 409 U.S. at 490; Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 474 (1973); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 559 (1973); United States v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co., 339 U.S. 261, 263 (1950); Kimble Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 8 (1949); Miller,
317 U.S. at 374;City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915).
8. See generally infra notes 14, 15, and 16.
9. A bilateral monopoly is “a hypothetical market condition in which there is only one buyer
and one seller, resulting in transaction delays because either party can hold out for a better deal . . . .”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (7th ed. 1999). Richard Epstein writes that a bilateral monopoly
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landowner would be in the advantageous position and able to refuse to
sell the property until he was offered compensation at least equal to the
surplus value created from the taking; presumably a greater amount than
what the landowner would have accepted in the open market.10
A simple example demonstrates this problem. If a city needs to
purchase twenty homes on a specific street, and the city has already
purchased nineteen of those homes, homeowner number twenty is clearly
in an advantageous bargaining position. That homeowner can hold out
until the city offers him, not the value of his home, but rather the total
surplus economic benefit that the city should realize by building the
road.11
Although the fair market value standard was intended to overcome
this bilateral monopoly problem, most scholars and individual
landowners agree that the fair market value system fails its main
function: to put landowners in the same pecuniary position as they would
have been in if their land had not been taken.12 Most scholars agree that
the current fair market value system fails,13 but few commentators have
considered why. I believe the functional ineptitude of the fair market
value begins and ends with the basic definitions of fair market value and
willing seller. This article begins by evaluating the fair market value.
Next, this article addresses the definitional ineptitudes associated with
occurs when one person has a “dominant holdout position that undercuts the effectiveness of the
bargaining process.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 116 (Harvard
Univ. Press) (1995). This hypothetical market would result every time the government attempted to
purchase property with a true public need but the landowner was not readily willing to sell and
therefore holds out to take advantage of the government’s position. Russell Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1136–37 (2000).
10. Because the landowner can hold out until he sucks out all the surplus value created due to
the taking, a landowner may hold out until the taking is not longer efficient. The idea of efficiency is
considered at infra notes 42–-55 and accompanying text (arguing that a taking is efficient where the
benefits to the public outweigh the costs to the public).
11. A city would only be induced to build a new road where the economic benefits outweigh
the economic costs. This difference in value is the surplus that the homeowner could take once the
city has already heavily invested in the project. Although a true economic decision would surely
ignore these sunk costs, the reality is that politicians do not have the luxury to make huge
investments with taxpayer money and then ignore the investments at the last minute because of a
snag in the process. For example, consider Boston’s infamous “Big Dig” where the politicians have
had problems placating upset citizens over these “sunk costs” associated with this development. See,
Senate Recommends Big Dig Oversight, The BostonChannel.com, Dec. 29, 2004, at,
http://www.thebostonchannel.com/bigdig/4031850/detail.html.
12. See infra notes 15, 16, and 20. Between 1915 and 1983, forty-two articles were written
condemning the fair market value standard, but only one article was written that “contains anything
that could be called an attempt at an evaluative defense of [undercompensating property owners].”
See Debow, infranote 20 at n. 8 (citing Risinger, infra note 20 at 526). Since that time, no article has
been written supporting the fair market value, although many have been written disregarding it as
unjust.
13. See supra note 12.
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eminent domain – something call the “seller’s paradox.” Finally, this
article will describe potential alternative systems of compensation that
would resolve the seller’s paradox and thus be more just, while limiting
the bilateral monopoly problem.
III. THE FALLIBILITY OF “MARKET VALUE”
There are three basic criteria proposed by courts and scholars by
which a compensation scheme should be evaluated: (1) does it ensure
that landowners are fairly compensated for their loss;14 (2) does it
promote efficient use of the Takings Clause;15 and (3) does it prevent
rent-seeking activities by opportunistic landowners.16 Although federal
courts claim that the fair market value standard is not a “fetish”17 and that
the courts are open to other systems of compensation, the fair market
value system is applied almost exclusively in every case where
compensation is at issue.18 Unfortunately, the fair market value scheme
fails miserably when it is evaluated by the three criteria mentioned
above. In fact, the system is so deficient that some courts have compared
compensation and eminent domain to a “Serbonian bog.”19
14. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
15. See A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932) (arguing that if companies
did not internalize the negative externalities associated with manufacturing their product, their
products would be under priced, which is an inefficient result); William Fischel & Perry Sharpiro,
Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretation of “Just
Compensation,” 17 J. LEG. STUDIES 269, 269–70 (1988) (“The compensation requirement serves the
dual purpose of offering a substantial amount of protection to private entitlements while disciplining
the power of the state.”); and James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277 (1985). But see, Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L & ECON. 13, 28–34 (1960) (arguing against Pigou’s assertions concerning social cost).
16. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L.
REV. 277, 309 (2001); Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 65
(November, 1986); Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 253,
260, 273 (1986) (arguing that the Takings Clause is intended to prevent rent-seeking); Fischel &
Sharpiro, supra note 15, at 276; Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 279, 290–94 (1992). See also William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of
Airport Noise, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1972); Louis De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for
Government Investment Choices, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 13 (1969); RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (Harvard Univ. Press) (1985); M. BRUCE
JOHNSON, Takings and the Private Market, in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES (Bernard H. Siegan ed.,
Lexington Books 1977).
17. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1979).
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Generally, three alternatives exist to determine
the fair market value of land: (1) comparable sells, (2) income capitalization, and (3) reproduction or
replacement costs less depreciation. Montague, infra note 20, at 12–1. Many courts will stubbornly
apply the fair market value standard even where accepted alternatives are more appropriate.
19. See, e.g., Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tex. 1961), quoted
in Montague, Supra note 20, at 12–4 (endorsing the dictum although admitting that the author has no
idea what a Serbonian bog is). As a metaphor, a “Serbonian bog” refers to “a mess from which there
is no way of extricating oneself.” DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 n.1 (3d Cir.
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A. Adequate Compensation
Under the fair market value system, landowners are not adequately
compensated for the loss of their property. Many scholars argue that the
fair market value system systematically undercompensates individuals
because the system does not consider all the costs that the landowner
realizes when his or her land is taken.20 Some of these costs include lost
business profits and goodwill,21 removal costs,22 litigation costs,23 and
demoralization costs.24

2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). The metaphor refers to a quagmire in
Egypt where it is fabled that entire armies have been swallowed up. Potter, The Serbonian Bog: A
Brief History of a Judicial Metaphor, 28 TULANE MARITIME L.R. 519 (2004) (describing the
original Serbonian Bog as “‘a treacherous mixture of sand and water on the coast of Lower Egypt’”
that would trap and consume boats and even entire armies (internal citation omitted)).
20. See generally ROGER CLEGG, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, in
REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, 55 (Roger Clegg ed., Nat’l Legal
Ctr. for the Pub. Interest 1994); Epstein, supra note 16, at 53 (1985); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The
Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 934, 945–49 (Nov. 2003);
Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579
(1995); Ann E. Gergen, Why Fair Market Value Fails As Just Compensation, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL’Y (1993); H. Dixon Montague, The Wonderful World of Eminent Domain: A Factual
Analysis of a Fantasy World’s Determination of Just Compensation, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 12–1 (1992); Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern
Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1991); Laura H.
Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future Interests: Empirical Evidence on the
Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989 BYU L. REV. 789 (1989); Durham, supra note 15, at 1313; and
Michael Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When
Business Premises Are Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 483, 526-40 (1985) (listing an
annotated bibliography of fifty-one titles published from 1916 through 1983 critiquing the current
method of compensation in eminent domain actions).
21. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U.S. 341, 343–46 (1925).
22. See General Motors,323 U.S. 373 at 379–80; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S.
261, 267-68 (1950).
23. See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 202-03 (1979). See also UNIFORM
RELOCATION ASSISTANCE AND REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICIES ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 4601
(1988) (authorizing limited assistance to homeowners and business owners who are the targets of
federal takings). For an overview of the statute, see, Catherine R. Lazuran, Annotation: Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 33 A.L.R. FED. 9 (1977).
24. Demoralization costs are “the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities
which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation
is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production caused by
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers distributed by the
thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.” Frank
I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (footnote omitted). Homeowners suffer
significant demoralization costs when their homes are taken because the homeowner is required to
abandon his or her home as well as suffer the emotional distress caused by being pushed aside so the
government can use the land as it sees fit. Durham, supra note15, at 1306–08 [does this refer to the
Durham article in note 16?]. This may even be amplified in traditional American society because
most property owners view land as literally belonging wholly to the landowner, rather than
belonging to the landowner unless the government wants the land. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO
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In addition to the past and present costs associated with losing
property, the market value approach also fails to adequately compensate
individuals because it does not adequately consider future interests.25
Courts have consistently recognized that owners of reversions and
remainders – both vested and contingent – are entitled to share in
condemnation awards based on the fair market value of the entire fee.26
However, executory interests, possibilities of reverter, and powers of
termination are considered too remote and speculative to be capable of
valuation.27 These interests are not calculated into the compensation
award.
Empirical evidence supports the contention that the fair market value
fails to justly compensate landowners. Specifically, the disparity between
the “fair market” value and the jury award or negotiated settlement –
presumably based on what a jury or arbitrator believe the fair market
value to be –is often very large.28 For example, the government offered
$357,000 for the General Motors Poletown plant in the famous Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit29 case. However, the negotiated
settlement increased the amount of compensation to $5,100,000.30 Other
cases show compensations for different takings moving from $11,500 to
$200,000, and from $11,000 to $5,000,000.31 Clearly, these disparities
indicate that, at a minimum, the fair market value is simply not a good
indicator of actual market value.32
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690) (this is a leading treatise that was instrumental inshaping
American property rights).
25. Burney, supra note 20, at 802.
26. See Browder, The Condemnation of Future Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 461, 468–69 (1962)
(discussing valuation and award of different future interests). See also, Burney, supra note 20, at
803, n. 61.
27. Id.
28. When a jury is evaluating the compensation question, the model jury instruction in
federal courts is that the jury should consider the following:
Ordinarily just compensation for property taken is arrived at determining the ‘fair market
value.’ However, fair market value is not the sole measure of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings. ‘Fair market value’ is the price at which a willing buyer
and a willing seller will trade, both having a reasonable knowledge of the facts.
3A Fed. Jury Prac. & Inst. Ch. 154 7(a) (5th ed.) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the jury is
considering the same question as the government appraisers.
29. 304 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1981).
30. The Law Offices of Ackerman & Ackerman, Case Profiles: General Motors Poletown
Plant—Land Clearance, Mistele Co. Parcel, available at, http://www.ackermanackerman.com/case2.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
31. The Law Offices of Ackerman & Ackerman, Case Profiles: Cobo Hall Convention
Center Expansion—Frank’s Bar & Restaurant Parcel and Buckland-Van Wald Furniture, Inc.
Parcel (respectively), available at, http://www.ackerman-ackerman.com/case3/html (last visited Jan.
22, 2005).
32. This does not mean that there is no place for fair market value as an indicator of value;
rather, this article posits the theory that, at least, it is not a very good indicator of actual value as
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An additional piece of evidence that the system of compensation is
inadequate is the sheer number of cases and complaints concerning
compensation in eminent domain actions. Common sense tells us that
almost every individual who is subject to condemnation and
subsequently loses his or her land is upset.33 Why is this the case?
Maybe the explanation for these ill feelings is derived from the idea that
Americans traditionally feel that their land belongs to them; the taking of
their land is diametrically opposed to this perceived property right.34
However, most landowners who complain about losing their property
complain, not because their property rights have been violated, but rather
because the level of compensation the landowners receive is perceived to
be unjust.35
The Utah Ombudsman office of the Department of Natural
Resources releases an annual report tracking the number of calls it
received concerning questions and complaints. The office is open to the
public to answer questions concerning “any issue involving local land
use and other controls placed on private property by state or local
government agencies.”36 In 2003, out of a total 190 calls concerning
takings, the office fielded 137 calls where landowners were primarily
concerned about the amount of compensation awarded.37 Economic
theory postulates that most individuals are neutral to the idea of their
property being taken if they are compensated justly.38 The reasoning for
this is that the landowner who is justly compensated feels that he is no

defined as the amount a willing seller would be willing to sell.
33. See infra note 36.
34. For an interesting example of this pervasive view in America, see Gary Andrew Poole,
Hold it! This Land is My Land!; Led by Commissioner Dick Carver, Nevada’s Nye County is Now
Ground Zero in the West’s War against the U.S. Government, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995 at
28.
35. See infra note 36.
36. Utah Department of Natural Resources, http://www.utahpropertyrights.com/ombudsman
_do.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
37. CRAIG M. CALL, OMBUDSMAN’S REPORT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY (2003). The figure of
137 calls is achieved by adding up the calls concerning the “settlement of the amount of just
compensation due in an eminent domain action” (130 calls) and the calls concerning “relocation of
families or businesses displaced by eminent domain” (seven calls). Relocation is a form of
compensation and therefore, it is included under questions concerning compensation. The total
number of compensation questions includes the previous two categories added to “General questions
about the law of eminent domain” (34 calls), “General questions about “takings law” (eleven calls),
and “General questions about eminent domain procedure” (eight calls).
38. SHARON OSTER, MODERN COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS, UNDERSTANDING THE IMPEDIMENTS
TO ENTRY, 51-83, (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (indicating that a risk-neutral profit maximizing firm
should base its decision to enter a market based on the net present value of expected profit).
However, this analysis leads to a second problem: most homeowners are not risk-neutral. Riskaverse landowners should base their decision to enter a market based on even higher discount rates
than risk-neutral firms use to base their decisions to enter a market.
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worse off after the taking than he was before the taking.39 However, the
reality is that most landowners do not feel that they are as well off after
the taking as before; and so they complain and litigate.40
Any one of these factors alone sufficiently demonstrates the
inadequacy of the fair market value system. However, these factors
together unequivocally demonstrate that landowners do not perceive the
just compensation scheme to be just at all.
B. Efficiency
In addition to the problem of inadequate compensation awarded in a
taking, the government does not internalize all of the costs associated
with the takings because the government systematically
undercompensates the landowners for their loss.41 This leads to
inefficient takings. The evidence that supports this contention is similar
to the evidence that supports the notion that the fair market value fails
the first criteria. In reality, this second criteria is a corollary of the first.
Governments do not internalize the true costs associated with the taking
because they do not pay the true costs.42 Along with the factors discussed
above, demoralization costs are important in understanding how the fair
market value fails to promote efficiency.43 When the government does
not fully compensate landowners for the value of their property,
government officials suffer under the fiscal illusion that the resources
taken have no opportunity costs; this leads to these officials engaging in
excessive takings.44 A taking is excessive when the true economic
benefits do not exceed the true economic costs.45
Landowners can be emotional, sometimes even irrational, when it
comes to their property. This leads to landowners valuing property at
well above its “market value.” According to the fair market value
standard, governments are required to pay 100 percent of the appraised

39. Id.
40. See supra note 37.
41. By “internalize” I mean realize and be forced to deal with. Although a government may
say that it considers the total costs associated with a taking, unless and until the government is forced
to pay the true costs associated with the taking, the government does not internalize these costs.
42. See supra notes 20–37 and accompanying text. See also Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete
Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 131 (2002).
43. See supra note 24.
44. See Michael Al Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999); Loius Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transactions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 528–32 (1986); Lawrence Blume et. al., The Taking of Land:
When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984).
45. See Heller, supra note 44.
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“market value” for the property they take.46 Ideally, the fair market value
system allows governments to take property that they value at its market
value and use it in a way whereby the property would be valued at
greater than its current market value. However, the flipside to this
argument is that governments may also take property from individuals
who value the property at well above the market rate (say 150 percent of
the appraised market rate) and use it for a less valuable purpose (say 110
percent of the appraised market rate).47
Clearly, using property for a less valuable purpose after a taking than
it was being used for before is an inefficient exercise of the Takings
Clause. In addition, it leads to demoralization costs for the landowner.
Demoralization costs are “the total of: (1) the dollar value necessary to
offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers
specifically from the realization that [inadequate] compensation is
offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their
sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other
occasion.”48 When property is taken and used for a less valuable purpose,
it makes sense that the landowners’ disutilities are increased because of
the increased frustration associated with losing property when the
property will not even be a net benefit to society.
The following two examples of recent takings actions demonstrate
the disutility associated with inefficient or perceived inefficient takings.
First, consider the case of Joanne and Jim Saleet who have owned their
home for thirty-eight years and refuse to sell to the city of Lakewood,
Ohio.49 When Jim and Joanne were dating, Jim would point to the
neighborhood in which he and his wife now live and say, “Joanne, one of
these days we are going to have one of these houses.”50 The Saleets do
not want to sell their home – even at the fair market value – because they
love where they live, and thus they value their home above the appraised
market rate. However, under the fair market value scheme, Lakewood is
not required to compensate the Saleets for the love and affection they

46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47. Although one can argued that a 10 percent increase in valuation over the market value to
the entire public is more significant than a 50 percent increase in value to one landowner, this
position, nevertheless, demonstrates that the criteria of promoting efficient government decisions, as
a corollary to making landowners whole, fail because they inadequately compensate landowners for
the value of their property.
48. See Michelman, supra note 24.
49. Eminent Domain: Being Abused? CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES, July 4, 2004, at,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml.
50. Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, supra note 51.
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feel towards their property. Clearly, the fair market value does not
attribute any value to emotional attachment of property.
Second, consider a case in Worcester Massachusetts where a city
wanted to raze a hundred-year old church for a bank parking expansion.51
How much did the landowner value the church? What about the
neighboring community and all the people who could say, that is where I
was blessed, baptized, or married? The church had enough support in the
neighborhood that a local preservation society raised funds through
private donations to relocate and renovate the church.52 Surely, the value
of the church to those who had an emotional interest was greater than the
value of the parking lot expansion; however, because Worcester did not
have to consider the emotional costs associated with razing the church,
the compensation for the property did not put these landowners in the
same pecuniary position that they otherwise would have been in if the
church had not been taken.53
Besides these demoralization costs, the substantial risks of high
litigation costs associated with takings makes it impossible for the
government to make efficient decisions. Governments cannot know the
total costs of a taking until years after the taking has occurred, after the
litigation dust has settled.54 If a project is expected to create an economic
value of $1,000,000 in present day figures, and the expected costs
associated with eminent domain and development are only $750,000, the
government would conclude that the benefits exceed the costs and that
this is a positive use of its eminent domain power. However, in the actual
scenario, a government cannot know what the expected costs associated
with eminent domain and development will be before opting to go ahead
with the project. Detroit obviously did not think the costs associated with
51. Linda Bock, Church May Become Village Center, TELEGRAM AND GAZETTE (Worchester
Mass.), July 15, 2000, at A4.
52. Just in Time, Historical Church Saved from Demolition, TELEGRAM AND GAZETTE
(Worcester Mass.) Sept. 19, 2000, at A10.
53. See supra note 5.
54. But see Ravi Jagannathn & Iwan Meier, Do We Need CAPM for Capital Budgeting?, 31
(4) FIN. MGMT., Dec. 22, 2002 at 55. This article presents the financial management tool of CAPM,
whereby the efficiency of a project may be discovered by discounting the future cash inflows and
comparing that value to the initial outlays. Part of the CAPM is unearthing the true costs of the
inflows using probability analysis. This is accomplished by multiplying different values by the
probability of that value being correct and then adding the products together. Governments should
become involved in this kind of analysis to estimate the cost of the takings product by: (1)
multiplying the initial offering by the probability that the offering will be accepted; (2) multiplying
an estimated final settlement by the probability that the settlement will be awarded but not litigation
costs; (3) multiplying the final settlement and litigation fees by the probability that both would be
awarded; and (4) adding up the three figures. The final figure could then serve to evaluate the
efficiency of the taking. Although this may make sense in theory, discovering the probabilities and
estimations of litigation and litigation outcomes is practically impossible. Thus, the government,
despite financial decision-making tools, cannot make efficient decisions.
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taking property in Poletown would be $5,100,000 instead of the measly
$357,000 originally offered. Sometimes governments take property and
spend so much money in litigation that the funds for a project dry up.55
Surely this is an inefficient use of the Takings power.
C. Prevent Rent-Seeking
Finally, the current system of compensation does little to prevent
rent-seeking, as defined below.56 Rent-seeking is a term “designed to
describe the behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to
maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus.”57 In the
Takings context, landowners engage in rent-seeking by trying to
maximize the gain that they receive from society even when the gain
creates social waste; this is just another way to describe the holdout
problem.58 Although the fair market value system prevents rent-seeking
by not allowing landowners to receive more compensation than the
appraised market value of their property, the fair market value system
actually works to encourage rent-seeking by others.59 A substantial
amount of literature shows that economic agents will engage in rentseeking to influence the establishment of legal policies, including
Takings and compensation.60 Rent-seeking must be discouraged because
it diverts limited public funds to private landowners.61 Unfortunately, the

55. See Paul Green, Eminent Domain: Mesa Flexes a Tyrannous Muscle, EAST VALLEY
TRIBUNE, Sept. 2, 2001; Robert Robb, Count on City-Driven Project to Fail, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 2001.
56. See Farber, supra note 16, at 290–94 . Farber argues that prohibiting compensation but
still allowing government takings would be more effective at preventing rent-seeking because the
landowners whose land is taken will more likely fight inefficient takings. Thus, Farber concludes,
“rent-seeking theory has a serious flaw as an account for the takings clause: it seems to present a
stronger case for banning compensation than for mandating it, if we are serious about controlling
rent-seeking.”
57. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, RENT SEEKING AND PROFIT SEEKING, IN TOWARD A THEORY
OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); Merrill, supra note 16,
at 65 (citing Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of the Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91 (1978)) (arguing barriers to
voluntary exchange include the holdout who is in a position to extract large profits from the
government because of the bargaining position that a holdout has over the government).
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59. But see Farber, supra note 16, at 294.
60. Chulo Jung et al., The Coase Theorem in a Rent-Seeking Society, 15 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 259, 260 (1995).
61. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, supra note 16 at 166–69 (1985); William Fischel, The
Offer/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A Constitutional Choice Perspective, 15
INT’L L. REV. & ECON. 187, 193 (1995) (arguing that paying landowners more than market value –
defined by what a reasonable person would pay for the property, not what the seller would accept as
adequate compensation to induce the sale – is wrong because this would waste public resources that
otherwise could have been used for public benefit).
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fair market value system does little to stave off the wasteful use of funds
for two reasons: the high administrative costs and the high litigation
costs associated with takings.
Administrative costs associated with takings are astronomical. One
notable scholar postulates that administrative costs are so high in certain
circumstances, that the open market may be more efficient than eminent
domain.62 Specifically, given what can collectively be called, “due
process costs” of eminent domain (i.e., obtaining legislative authority,
drafting and filing the complaint, serving process, securing a formal
appraisal, etc.) “it is safe to conclude that in a thick market setting,
eminent domain is a more expensive way of acquiring resources than
market exchange.”63 High administrative costs can offset any benefit that
society recognizes from using eminent domain. Thus, the only real
difference between traditional rent-seeking and these high administrative
costs is the individual who ultimately reaps the surplus.64 Under the
current system, administrators and lawyers, rather than landowners,
profit from the economic surplus that should go to society.
Besides administrative costs, litigation costs associated with takings
are extremely high. Consider the experience of the Goia family in
Garden Grove, California, who paid $778,000 for a parcel of land in
1990 and added $100,000 to the land so they could open a small autorepair shop.65 Seven years later, the City Council condemned the Goia’s
land, and the market value was set at only $640,000.66 The Goias sued,
claiming the compensation award was not just, and a jury awarded them
$1,070,000.67 Additionally, after three years of litigation, another jury

62. Merrill, supra note 16, at 77–78. Thomas Merrill is not alone in this assessment. Some
research suggests that eminent domain is not less costly to the government than voluntary market
transactions. See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473
(1976); A. Mitchell Plinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right,
Liability Rule, and Tax Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979).
63. Plinsky, supra note 63, at 1. A “thin” market is a market in which rent-seeking
opportunities can occur by the seller. For instance, the market may be “thin” in our situation where
the government has purchased a row of nineteen houses and has built the road up to the twentieth
house. The twentieth homeowner knows that the government needs his property and has already
invested a large sum of money to purchase and develop the first nineteen lots. Thus, the twentieth
homeowner stands in a position to take advantage of the government and extract high costs to sell
his land. In theory, the government would be willing to pay up to the point where the public benefits
are being paid entirely to the twentieth landowner instead of going to the public. In contrast, a
market is “thick” where market conditions do not allow the seller to extract economic rents. See also
Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 79–81 (1985), for another example of the
use of thick and thin markets.
64. Rent-seeking distributes funds to sellers. Administrative costs distribute the same funds
to assessors, planers, and attorneys for both sides of the case.
65. Property Rights Victories, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Nov. 26, 2000.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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awarded the Goias $620,000 for their attorney fees; an amount almost as
high as the originally offered compensation.68 Like administrative fees,
high litigation costs reallocate limited public resources from society to
others. These costs have the same effect as overpaying opportunistic
landowners; however, instead of opportunistic landowners stealing the
surplus from society, attorneys and litigants get it instead.
Although the fair market value system does a good job of preventing
rent-seeking by landowners, the system is so deficient that it actually
encourages rent-seeking by others. This list includes the number of
administrators, attorneys, and litigants.
IV. THE SELLER’S PARADOX
As stated, courts use the fair market value of the condemned land
almost exclusively to determine what level of compensation is just.69 Fair
market value is defined as the price that a willing buyer would pay a
willing seller in the open market.70 When a government flexes its
eminent domain muscle, society knows who the willing buyer is – the
government. But who is the willing seller? A willing seller is a seller
who is willing to sell at market value.71 This definition, however, does
not make sense in the Takings context because of the circular nature of
the definition of a willing seller.
By substituting the definition of fair market value (ignoring the
willing buyer) into the definition of willing seller, the willing seller is

68. Id.
69. See supra note 7. However, the courts said that they are at least open to the idea of using
income capitalization and/or reproduction or replacement cost, less depreciation, to determine
market value. See Montague, supra note 20, at 12–29 (citing AMERICAN INST. OF REAL ESTATE
APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1974)).
70. See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633
(1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
71. The term “willing seller” is not actually defined anywhere. The definition used in this
article comes from logical extrapolation of the definition of market value from BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1548 (7th ed. 1999).
Fair Market Value – The price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to
pay on the open market and in an arm’s-length transaction; the point at which supply and
demand intersect.
In essence, the definition of market value is the price that a willing seller would accept. Therefore, I
conclude that a willing seller is a seller who is willing to accept the market value. Some state courts,
have defined “willing seller” to mean, “a seller who is willing to sell but who is not compelled.”
Bowers v. Fulton County, 146 S.E.2d 884, 893 (Ga. 1966). However, this is the essentially the same
as saying “the seller who is neutral to the idea of selling because they are no worse- (or better-) off
after the sale than they were before the sale and are therefore willing to sell, but not compelled.” See
supra note 5.
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defined as the seller who is willing to sell at a price at which the seller is
willing to sell. Confused yet? It is no wonder that courts have compared
just compensation analysis to a Serbonian bog!72 This is confusing
precisely because fair market value, by definition, assumes a willing
seller; but a willing seller, by definition, assumes a fair market value.
The definition of willing seller is borrowed from general economics.
However, as we just saw, the definitions are circular and confusing when
applied to the housing market.73 The housing market is not a traditional
market.74 In a traditional market, the goods are fungible and easily
obtained.75 In the land market, however, the goods are not fungible in the
least; every piece of land is unique.76 In a market for a fungible good, the
market price is the price at which the supply and the demand curves
intersect.77 Because substitutes are readily available, a seller would not
be able to sell any product if the seller priced the product above the
prevailing market rates. On the other side of the coin, however, a seller
could sell 100 percent of his wares at the prevailing market price and
thus has no incentive to offer his wares for below market price.
In the housing market, “fair market value” is a fiction. Every piece of
land is unique, and thus a traditional market with perfect substitutes does
not exist. Also, in the housing market, only one seller exists as opposed
to a number of sellers with substitute goods. The only common
characteristic that the land “market” shares with a traditional market is
that generally a number of different buyers exist. Appraisers use this
characteristic to justify their imprecise evaluations. Appraisals in housing
markets focus solely on the buyer. An appraiser looks through a home
and tries to guess what a buyer would offer. This analysis, however,
completely ignores the willingness of the seller because the appraisal

72. See supra note 19.
73. The term “willing seller” is so confusing that some courts have held that any reference to
the willingness or unwillingness of the seller to sell should not be included in jury instructions for
fear that it may be prejudicial. See Bowers, 146 S.E.2d at 893; Illinois I & M. R. Co. v. Easterbrook,
71 N.E. 1116, 1118 (Ill. 1904).
74. A traditional market is a market where the goods are fungible and substitutes are readily
available. The goods traded on the Chicago Board of Trade are examples of goods in a traditional
market.
75. The Chicago Board of Trade is a traditional market where many substitutes exist.
76. It is precisely because every piece of land is unique that government needs eminent
domain. If land were not unique, a bilateral monopoly would not exist. See supra note 9. A
government does not need to use eminent domain to purchase fungible goods in a thick market. See
Merrill, supra note 16, at 77-78. Whether the government should use eminent domain powers when
it is such a large purchaser that the government changes the supply and demand curve for normal
markets is debatable. However, it is because land is unique and the government needs that particular
piece of land with no available substitute that necessitates eminent domain.
77. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC
REASONING, 4–9 (Aspen 2002).
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assumes that the seller will accept the highest price offered after a
reasonable time.78
With these considerations in mind, the housing market is more like
an auction with a reserve price rather than a traditional market.79 Courts
conveniently ignore these distinctions and approximate what the market
price for the land would be, and then claim that the willing seller is the
seller who would be willing to sell at the approximated value.80 This is
an impermissible leap of logic that I call the seller’s paradox.
The seller’s paradox arises because courts define the willingness of
sellers to sell by using the fair market price, which assumes a willing
seller. Using an unknown variable (fair market value) to define a second
unknown variable (willing seller) does not lead us any closer to deriving
the actual value of the first variable (fair market value). A seller’s
willingness is a matter of degree that is affected by a multiplicity of
factors.81 Most notably, a seller’s willingness is a derivative of
opportunity costs and personal preferences.
“Willing” is a term of relativity, much like the term “cold.” Using
the term “willing” brings us no closer to understanding how willing the
seller is, just like using the term “cold” does not express what the actual
temperature is. It is not difficult to imagine a range of homeowners who
are “willing” to sell at different market values depending on the
individual homeowner’s situation. A small group of sellers will sell
property at any price because they do not need the money or want the
property. Some sellers are “motivated” because they have a second home
that they want to purchase or because they have another higher need for
78. The justification that courts use for this premise is that the landowner should only be
compensated for the land and not for personal preferences. However, this reasoning is flawed. The
only reason land has any value is because the owner is willing to sell. Where an item has so much
intrinsic value that a seller would never sell, we call it “priceless.” Only the seller can decide when
the buyer’s offer adequately compensates the seller for the seller’s opportunity costs and personal
preferences. Thus, although the appraisal has some value – estimating the amount of money that a
buyer would be willing to pay – this is only the first step in the analysis. The unanswered question
that an appraiser ignores is whether the seller would be willing to sell at the price that the buyer
offers. The appraisal does not answer this question nor does it attempt to answer this question. This
does not mean that the appraisal has no value, but it does not fully answer the question of where the
willing seller and willing buyer would meet in an arms-length transaction. See Olson, supra note 5.
79. The reserve price would be the lowest price that the landowner would accept.
80. ALAN T. ACKERMAN, Effective Use of Real Estate Appraisers, in CURRENT
CONDEMNATION LAW (Paul V. O’Leary ed., American Bar Association 1994).
81. See Barbra White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 577, 610–11 (1987) (arguing that “willingness” to purchase a good is determined by desire and
the wealth of the buyer so that “the marketplace . . . is not a value-free indicator and should be used
with extreme caution.”). This same argument applies equally well to the willingness of a seller to
sell, as will be presented, and indicates that market value should be used with extreme caution even
in the absence of a true willing buyer. See also Ackert et al., Emotion and Financial Markets:
Human Decisions Affect Economy, 88 (2) ECON. REV.(ATLANTA, GEORGIA), Apr. 1, 2003, at 33
(arguing that “unemotional logic” in financial decision-making is misplaced).
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money. Some sellers are neutral to the idea of selling their home and will
hold out until they are offered a price that is “fair” – i.e., a price that
leaves them no worse off. Other sellers are reluctant to sell because they
have emotional ties to their property or they are concerned with finding
adequate substitute property; but ultimately these sellers can still be
bought off at a price higher than neutral sellers. Finally, some sellers will
refuse to sell their property regardless of how unreasonable their refusals
seem to be. Obviously, “willing” is not a well-defined term, and as such,
it is improper to use a term that is not well defined in the first place to
define a different term in the second place.
Which of these five options accurately describes the willing seller in
an eminent domain action? If we were dealing with fungible goods, it
would be the neutral seller because every player in the transaction knows
the market price and can therefore know what the fair price is. Thus, with
fungible goods we can derive exactly how willing the sellers are because
we start with a firmly defined fair market price. However, when we are
dealing with a unique good, like land, we do not have a fair market value
to start with; and hence, we cannot say how willing the willing seller
should be.82
The seller’s paradox is not unresolvable, however. It may be
resolved in one of two ways: either we must accurately assess the fair
price of a piece of property and then derive the willing seller – like as in
fungible markets – or we must define who the willing seller is and then
derive the fair price. Scholars who address the compensation question do
so by first trying to better define the fair market value in a way that will
better satisfy the three criteria discussed in Part II and thereby implicitly
derive who the willing seller is.83 However, the alternative approach of
first defining the willing seller and using that definition to derive the fair
market value more accurately, as demonstrated below.
V. THE WILLINGNESS MODELS
The willingness model attempts to define exactly how willing the
seller is to sell before the land is taken, and then to use that precise
82. This does not mean that appraised land values are useless. Obviously there is some need
to have land appraised. However, in the context of eminent domain, land appraisals generally are
useless. Courts do not want to pay “too much” for land so they make the seller and the buyer faceless
entities. Still, property only has value because someone is willing to sell at a price (otherwise it is
called priceless). Rational sellers are only willing to sell to the extent that they are compensated for
their opportunity costs and personal preferences. As applied to eminent domain actions, it makes no
sense to try to estimate what an average buyer would be willing to offer and impose that average
buyer standard on a seller when the housing market is so difficult to appropriately estimate. This is
the only area of law where the injured victim is consciously ignored.
83. See supra notes 20, 24, and 57–-62.

79]

THE SELLER’S PARADOX

95

definition of willingness to determine the fair market value of the land.
Two methods exist to determine the willingness of sellers of land: the
macro approach and the micro approach.
A. The Macro Approach
The macro approach is based on statistical measurements. The fair
market value fails to justly compensate landowners because the willing
seller is not defined, and the willing seller is a central assumption in
assessing fair market value. However, if the housing market were a
perfectly normalized market and just as many sellers were willing to sell
below market price as above, then paying the mean price would
adequately compensate landowners on the whole. This result is likely
because on a normalized bell curve, the number of sellers who would be
willing to sell for less than market value would actually be paid more,
and the number of sellers who would only be willing to sell for more
than the fair market value would actually be paid less. These two groups
would be properly averaged and overall the landowners would be put in
substantially the same position pecuniarily as they would have been if
the government had not taken their property.
The key to the macro approach is to be able to normalize the sellers’
willingness. To normalize this curve, first, enough data would have to be
gathered to determine the willingness of sellers to sell their property.
Second, the data would have to be organized in some meaningful way,
dependant on the factors that sellers consider when they determine their
level of willingness.84 Third, the data would have to be normalized in a
perfect bell curve.85 Finally, using the normalized bell curve, the mean
could be used as a multiplier of the fair market value.86
For example, if it is discovered through data farming that the
average homeowner in a community who has lived in her home for four
years and has 50 percent of her wealth invested in the home would be
neutral to the idea of selling her home at 1.2 times the estimated market
84. For instance, the length of time that landowners have resided at their home will affect
their attachment to the land and ultimately affects their willingness to sell. Other factors may include
the percentage of a landowner’s total wealth that the land represents, the landowner’s sex, and the
amount of sweat equity that the landowner has invested in the property.
85. A bell curve is normalized by finding how far from the mean an individual is by counting
standard deviations. In the macro approach, the mean would be some measure of neutral willingness,
and then the number of standard deviations from that willingness would determine the breadth of the
curve.
86. To see an example of a hypothetical, non-normalized curve of the willingness to sell in
relation to the assessed price using current assessment measurements, see graph 1 in appendix A.
Although this graph is just a hypothetical estimation and is not based on any data, it is likely a
reasonable estimation.
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value, then the 1.2 figure can work as a multiplier for all homeowners
similarly situated. Surely, some homeowners in this category would be
willing to sell for only 1.1 times the estimated market value and others
would only be willing to sell for 1.3 times the estimated market value.
However, on average, these similarly situated landowners would be
fairly compensated. The nicety of this approach is that it first defines
how willing a seller is to sell, and then uses that figure to define the
market value that would make the seller whole.
One difficulty of this approach, however, is the moral hazard of data
farming. Data farming would assess the willingness of the public through
surveys or other techniques. No matter what technique the government
employs to data farm, ultimately, the landowners – or at least a
statistically significant sample of landowners – must give the information
about their willingness to sell. The landowners participating in the
surveys have a strong incentive to vastly underestimate their willingness
to sell, but they have no incentive to overestimate their willingness to
sell. Practically, unless data farming is done carefully, the holdout
problem that the fair market valuation scheme attempts to avoid would
occur earlier in the process – before the taking instead of after.
Another difficulty with the macro approach is determining how the
multiplier should change depending on multiple owners of a single piece
of property. For instance, suppose three recorded owners for a piece of
property exist: a cosigner who has never lived on the property; a husband
who has lived in the house for ten years and has invested sweat equity
into making the house just as he likes it; and a wife who has lived in the
house for two years, but who hates it. Should the macro approach
advocate choosing one of the three landowners or some kind of fictional
person where the three individuals are multiplied together? This is a
difficult question, but must be answered if the macro approach is serious
about determining the landowner’s willingness to sell.
B. The Micro Approach and the Self-Assessment Model
The micro approach is based on determining each landowner’s
individual willingness to sell and then using that figure to determine the
appropriate market value. One way to do this is through self-assessment.
A self-assessment mechanism can be used in conjunction with the taxbased insurance model to determine the willingness of individual sellers.
Under the self-assessment model, first landowners would receive a
property value assessment. In many states, property taxes are already
determined through an annual assessment. The value of the assessment
represents the value that the landowner initially paid for the property
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adjusted for appreciation. If the property owners could increase this
valuation, it would then reflect their willingness to sell. They would
return the increased assessment to the government, and pay taxes on their
valuation of the property. If their land is taken within a predetermined
period of time,87 landowners would receive a discounted amount of their
self-assessed valuation.88 If their land is taken after the introductory
period, landowners would receive the full amount of their self-assessed
value.
For example, assume a government determines that five years is a
sufficient introductory period for the self-assessment model to effectively
deter rent-seeking.89 A landowner buys a home in year one for $100,000.
The landowner receives a property tax assessment in year one that
assesses the value of his home at $100,000.However, this landowner
feels that he got a good deal on the property and values his property at
ten percent more than his initial price; he thus returns the assessment
saying, “I value my land at $110,000.”90 Thus, the property owner would
pay taxes on his self-assessed valuation or $110,000; and if the property
owner pays 30 percent taxes, he would pay $3,300 in taxes the first year.
In year two, the landowner would receive a property value assessment of
$110,000 ($100,000 adjusted for the 10percent increase) plus any
appreciation. If the landowner feels that this is correct, he would pay
taxes on this assessment. If the landowner now feels that 10 percent is
87. The initial period must be long enough so that the landowner cannot anticipate the
government’s actions and take advantage of the information by adjusting their valuation. This
satisfies one of the problems addressed by Daniel Farber in his article Public Choice and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 284 (1992) (arguing that adverse selection of privatized
insurance could be limited by requiring private insurance coverage to be purchased well in advance
of the taking).
88. The amount of compensation would be 100 percent of the initial property valuation
assessment, adjusted for each year with an increase toward 100percent of their self-assessed value.
See Appendix A, illustrating this increase.
89. Because individuals would be required to pay taxes under the higher self-assessed model,
taxpayers have an incentive not to overvalue their property. However, information is clearly the key
to this system. This system works to avoid rent-seeking by forcing the landowner to value the
property at a period of time before any information about the potential taking could leak to the
general public. Otherwise, the landowner would be in a position to engage in rent-seeking. See
Farber, supra note 16.
90. Practically, the landowner would not value the land at 10% over the market value and
then adjust the property assessment by that amount. Rational landowners would consider the
probability that their land is taken and multiply this by the desired percentage increase. This amount
would work as a multiplier for the property assessment value. For instance, if a landowner values the
land at 10 percent above the valuation, and the property owner thinks there is a 2 percent chance that
his property would be taken, the rational landowner would increase the amount of property valuation
assessment by 0.2 percent. Therefore, if his property were valued at $100,000, the landowner would
increase the assessment to $100,200 (100,000 * 1.002).
Note also that takings are often considered low-probability events. Kaplow, supra note 44, at 602.
Arguably, a number of landowners would think that their property was “safe” from takings and not
self-assess for a greater value.
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too low, he can up the valuation again. This process would continue until
the landowner transferred the property, in which case the scenario would
start over. If the government takes the land and the landowner has paid
the higher rate consistently for the five-year period, then the landowner
would get the full amount of the assessment. If the land were taken
within the five-year period, then the landowner would get the initial
valuation plus a portion of the increase depending on the statutory
valuation.91
The self-assessment model avoids the multiple-landowner problem
left unresolved by the macro approach. In the self-assessment model, the
multiple landowners (not the government) have the burden of coming
together to determine how much they value their property.
VI. THE PROS AND CONS OF THE WILLINGNESS MODELS
The specific approaches of the willingness models have been
invented to resolve the seller’s paradox. This section will discuss some of
the strengths and perceived weaknesses of the willingness models.
The willingness models satisfy the three criteria enumerated in
section III of this paper better than the fair market value system.92 First,
the willingness models would more justly compensate the landowners for
the value of their property. As previously discussed, the land market is
not a traditional market;93 instead, it is more like an auction with a
reserve price. In an auction market, the highest bidder is the winner, not
the average bidder. Because land is truly unique, landowners are in the
advantageous position to hold out until the bidder meets their reserve
price. Using a general market schematic to replicate the housing market
is simply inappropriate as it completely distorts this auction process. The
self-assessment model, on the other hand, replicates an auction model by
allowing landowners to self-declare at what price they would be willing
to sell; much like the sellers at an auction setting their reserve price.
Because the willingness models compensate individuals based on their
willingness to sell, landowners are brought much closer to the pecuniary
position that they would have occupied if their land had not been taken
than if they were compensated under the fair market value system.
Second, the willingness models will lead to more efficient decisions
by governments than the current market value system.94 The willingness
models better reflect the true cost of the land by reflecting the value of
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Table 1 in Appendix A for an example of a valuation chart.
See supra notes 14–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 42–55 and accompanying text.
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the land to the landowner. Under the willingness models, the government
internalizes the cost of the land to landowners, because the government
has to pay for the cost of the land to landowners.95 Additionally, under
the self-assessment model specifically, litigation costs are lower and the
possibility that landowners would receive large payouts for the value of
their land from a sympathetic jury is greatly reduced. The landowner of
course is free to litigate the amount of compensation he received for his
land, but under the self-assessment model it is considerably more
difficult for a landowner to go to court and argue that the amount of
compensation should be greater than the amount the landowner received
because the landowner has already declared what he feels is just.96
Because governments are forced to internalize the costs at the outset of a
project, governments will be able to accurately determine the cost of the
taking. Governments could then weigh those costs against the projected
benefits to society. Where the benefits outweigh the true costs,
governments can go ahead with the taking with a high level of
confidence that their decisions are truly efficient.
Third, the willingness models would lower the probability of rentseekers.97 Although the amount paid to landowners for their property
would likely be higher when the land is taken, the net amount of the selfassessment model would likely be much lower. First, as demonstrated
above, the self-assessment model would limit litigation costs. Also, the
self-assessment model would limit administrative costs associated with
takings. Using the self-assessment model, landowners have a strong
incentive to ensure that the property tax assessment accurately reflect the
value of the land to the landowners. Governments could rely on the
property appraisals and thus would not have to waste a significant
amount of resources on administrative costs.
Finally, although it may cost more to compensate landowners, more
money will be available because landowners will pay more in property
taxes. The underlying purpose of preventing rent-seeking is to reserve
the maximum amount of money possible to use for the public good.98
The self-assessment model works to serve the needs of the public better
than the fair market value model by saving money on administrative and
litigation costs and raising more money to serve public needs. The net
95. See supra notes 42 and 44
96. This assumes that landowners values their land as reasonable landowners would value
the land. The only wiggle-room that would exist for the landowner would be for valuation that a
reasonable landowner would not reasonably anticipate. For instance, if a landowner owns land that
sits atop a large oil reserve, the landowner could litigate the valuation of the land that did not include
the value of the oil where the reasonable landowner would not know about the oil.
97. See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.
98. See Fischel, supra note 61, at 193.
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effect will be an increase in funds to serve the public. Thus, the purpose
of preventing rent-seeking would be adequately served by the selfassessment model despite paying additional funds to property owners.
The self-assessment model proposed here is not really a novel
approach. Although the majority of jurisdictions do not allow tax
assessments to be used as evidence for compensation purposes in an
eminent domain action,99 the idea has been considered in some.100
The biggest concern associated with the willingness model, and
specifically the self-assessment model, is that the assessment is
effectively a tax on the poor. The best analysis for whether this is the
case emerges from a consideration of vertical equity.
Vertical equity is the idea that taxpayers who have lower incomes
should pay less in income than taxpayers who have higher incomes.101
Some persons may argue that eminent domain actions generally go
through poorer neighborhoods more often than through rich
neighborhoods, and therefore poorer individuals have a greater incentive
to value their lands at higher rates than rich individuals, in violation of
vertical equity.102 However, this may not necessarily the case.
It is true that eminent domain actions do affect poorer neighborhoods
significantly more often than rich neighborhoods. It would appear,
therefore, that poor individuals have a greater incentive to value their
lands at higher rates than rich individuals, in violation of vertical equity.
Even if this is true, however, the self-assessment model may change this
trend. Eminent domain may go through poor neighborhoods for a
number of reasons, but one large consideration is that poorer
neighborhoods are cheaper to take. However, if the residents in the poor
neighborhoods begin to value their lands at higher amounts, it will not
necessarily be “cheaper” for a government to go through the poorer
areas. This is particularly true in light of the argument that poor
individuals are more risk-averse and therefore will value their property at

99. See State v. 45,621 Square Feet of Land, 475 P.2d 553, 557 (1970); Cook v. Indianapolis,
559 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (1990) (citing IND. CODE 6-1.1-31-6(c) (1988) which makes it improper to
use property tax assessments\ in an eminent domain action as evidence of fair market value).
100. See generally F & M Brewing Co. v. Lehigh County Bd. of Appeals, 530 Pa. 451, 456459 (1992) (discussing the difference of value-in-use, a variation of the self-assessment model, and
fair market value as applicable to tax assessments and eminent domain actions). See also Heindel v.
Town of Grafton, 140 Vt. 147, 149 (1981). Heindel discusses the rule that if the landowner wants to
lower the property assessment, the landowner bears the burden of proving that the government’s
assessment is higher than the fair market value. Theoretically, the government could later condemn
the land and use the landowner’s own arguments against the landowner to justify paying a lower
price for the land.
101. Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals and Legitamacy, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 549.
102. Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49, 69 n. 163
(1999).
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higher amounts than rich individuals.103 As the poor value their land at
higher amounts, the government’s incentive to condemn the poorer
property decreases. But as governments take more from the affluent
landowners, affluent landowners will have greater incentives to pay
additional taxes to protect their property. Thus, all parties will eventually
self-assess their land. The fact that eminent domain currently affects
poorer neighborhoods more often than richer neighborhoods is not
necessarily indicative of what the trend will be like in the future.
Therefore, it is not clear that the self-assessment model violates vertical
equity or would be simply a poor person tax.
VII. CONCLUSION
If we are serious about putting landowners in the same pecuniary
position as they would have occupied had their property not been taken,
the seller’s paradox must be resolved. This paper presents two possible
solutions to resolve the seller’s paradox, but surely additional (and
possibly better) solutions exist. The seller’s paradox is not a justification
to overcompensate landowners at the expense of the public good. Rather,
the seller’s paradox is an attempt to compensate landowners to the extent
that they are made neutral to the taking.
Whether the self-assessment micro approach or the macro approach
to resolving the seller’s paradox actually works remains uncertain.
However, until legislatures and courts stop ignoring the logical
inconsistencies of the fair market value system by overlooking the
willingness of a seller to sell, those who stand in the way of the public
need will continue to be systematically undercompensated for the value
of their property.
Nathan Burdsal*

103. See Farber, supra note 16.
* JD candidate, 2006. With special thanks to Professor John Fee for his mentorship, and with loving
gratitude to Lisa Burdsal for her patience and support.

102

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 20

APPENDIX A
Table 1
Percent of self-assessed
value to be paid
0%
15%
35%
55%
80%
100%

Year
Year 0
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5

Number of
Homeowners willing
to sell

Graph 1

70%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140%

150%

160%

Price, expressed as a percentage of current
assessed fair market value

NOTE TO GRAPH 1–This graph is just a hypothetical estimation
and is not based on any farmed data. However, common sense says that
the number of landowners who are willing to sell at or above the market
rate will take a form similar to what is presented here. Please note that
the percentage is the lowest price that the willing seller would have
accepted. Again, the goal is to make the seller whole, meaning make the
seller neutral to the forced sell because he is no worse or better off than
before. Any rent-seeking individual would accept a price at or above
their willingness level.

